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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, with whom McKEE, Chief Judge, 
and SCIRICA, RENDELL, AMBRO, SMITH, CHAGARES, 
JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, Jr., VANASKIE, 
and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges join:  
 
 Petitioner Ramiro Rojas entered the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident in 2003 when he was 12 years old.  
Six years later, Rojas pled guilty to possessing drug 
paraphernalia in violation of Pennsylvania law and was 
ordered to pay a fine and court costs.  The Department of 
Homeland Security (the “Department”) then initiated removal 
proceedings against Rojas, contending that he was removable 
for having violated a law “relating to a controlled substance 
(as defined in section 802 of Title 21).”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Rojas sought to terminate the proceedings 
on the theory that the offense that constitutes the basis of 
removal must involve a substance defined in section 802 of 
Title 21, i.e., a federally controlled substance, but that the 
Department had failed to meet such a burden in this particular 
case.  The immigration agencies disagreed that 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) imposes that requirement and ordered 
Rojas removed. 
 
After consideration of Rojas‟s petition for review by a 
three-judge panel of our Court, we sua sponte ordered that the 
case be heard en banc.  See Third Cir. I.O.P. 9.4 (2010).  We 
now grant Rojas‟s petition for review and conclude that, in a 
removal proceeding under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the Department 
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must show that the conviction for which it seeks to remove a 
foreign national involved or was related to a federally 
controlled substance.  The record here was silent as to the 
drug involved.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
Department failed to meet its burden and remand the case for 
the agency to determine whether the Department may have 
another opportunity to demonstrate that Rojas‟s conviction 
involved a federally controlled substance. 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. 
 
Rojas is a 22-year old citizen of the Dominican 
Republic who entered the United States in 2003 as a lawful 
permanent resident and has resided in the country ever since.  
In December 2009, Rojas pled guilty to possessing drug 
paraphernalia and was assessed a fine and court costs by the 
Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, 
Pennsylvania.
1
  
 
Contending that this conviction rendered Rojas 
removable under Section 237 of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (“INA”), the Department instituted 
removal proceedings against him in York, Pennsylvania.  
This statute provides: 
 
Any alien who at any time after admission has 
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy 
or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a 
                                                          
1
  The charges were brought pursuant to 35 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. § 780-113(a)(32). 
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State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21), other than a single 
offense involving possession for one‟s own use 
of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable. 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
2
 
 
B. 
 
In the proceeding before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), 
the Department submitted Rojas‟s guilty plea and colloquy 
and a police criminal complaint pertaining to the drug 
paraphernalia case.  The guilty plea and colloquy state only 
that Rojas pled to “Drug Para [sic] 1 yr, 2,500 fine,” App. 
185a (guilty plea); 186a (plea colloquy), but do not indicate 
what paraphernalia or what substance was involved in the 
crime of conviction.  The police criminal complaint, on the 
other hand, states that the paraphernalia consisted of “loose 
cigar paper and [a] plastic baggie” with marijuana.  App. 
190a.  However, due to serious issues regarding the reliability 
of this document, see infra Part IV.C, and because the 
Department argued that the fact of conviction alone rendered 
Rojas removable, neither the immigration agencies nor the 
                                                          
2
  Initially, the Department also charged Rojas as 
removable on the basis of a March 31, 2009 guilty plea to one 
count of possession of a small amount of marijuana (less than 
30 grams) in violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(31).  
Subsequently, however, the Department conceded that this 
conviction did not render Rojas removable because it fell 
within the less-than-30-grams escape clause of 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Accordingly, only the drug-paraphernalia 
conviction is at issue. 
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parties ultimately relied on the police criminal complaint.  
The record of uncontested materials before the agencies was 
thus silent as to the substance involved in Rojas‟s 
paraphernalia conviction. 
 
Rojas moved to terminate the proceedings, arguing 
that “[t]he plain language of [§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)(a)] requires 
[the Department] to prove that the substance underlying an 
alien‟s state-law conviction for a possessory offense is one 
that is defined in Section 102 of the Controlled Substance[s] 
Act [(“CSA”)].”  App. 129a-30a.  In this regard, Rojas noted 
that Pennsylvania‟s controlled-substances schedules list drugs 
that are not in the federal schedules and contended that the 
official record of his conviction is silent with respect to the 
substance involved.
3
  The parties agree that, at the time of 
                                                          
3
  The Commonwealth includes many objects in its 
definition of drug paraphernalia, including typically 
innocuous items such as blenders, bowls, and balloons, see 35 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-102(b), but a defendant cannot be found 
guilty of violating the paraphernalia law unless he used or 
intended to use an object in connection with a substance 
criminalized by Pennsylvania law, id. § 780-113(a)(32); see 
also Commonwealth v. Torres, 617 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992) (explaining that to obtain a conviction for 
possession of drug paraphernalia “the Commonwealth must 
establish that the items possessed[] were used or intended to 
be used with a controlled substance”).  Pennsylvania law 
further defines a “controlled substance” as “a drug, substance, 
or immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V of 
[the Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and 
Cosmetic Act].”  35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-102(b).  Federal 
law, by contrast, defines “controlled substance” in the CSA as 
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Rojas‟s conviction, Pennsylvania‟s controlled-substances 
schedules contained three narcotics that were not then in the 
federal schedules—“dextrorphan,” “1-(3-
trifluoromethylphenyl)piperazine,” and “propylhexedrine.”  
See Resp‟t‟s Resp. to Letter Br. at 1-3, Oct. 12, 2012. 
 
C. 
 
The IJ denied Rojas‟s motion to terminate the 
proceedings and ordered him removed to the Dominican 
Republic, concluding that “a state‟s drug statute need not 
align perfectly with the CSA” in order for a drug-
paraphernalia conviction to serve as the basis for removal.  
App. 53a.  Although the IJ reasoned that “[t]his only makes 
sense” because “[i]t‟s highly doubtful Congress would intend 
for an alien to escape the immigration consequences for being 
convicted under a State or foreign controlled substance law 
simply because the drug was not listed in the CSA,” id., he 
did not address the import of his ruling on the words “as 
defined in section 802 of Title 21.”   
 
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”), Rojas reiterated the argument that “[t]he plain 
language of Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the INA requires that 
in order for a conviction to make an alien removable on the 
basis of a controlled substance offense, [the Department] 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
substance underlying an alien‟s state law conviction is one 
                                                                                                                                  
a “drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included 
in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter,” 
but “does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, 
or tobacco.”  21 U.S.C. § 802(6). 
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covered by” the CSA.  App. 7a.  The BIA, however, also 
disagreed.  The BIA did not squarely confront the issue of 
whether a noncitizen could be removed for a conviction 
involving a substance that is not federally controlled.  Instead, 
it focused on the statute‟s use of the words “relating to” and 
concluded that drug-paraphernalia statutes “relate to” 
controlled substances despite the lack of equivalence between 
the drug schedules of a particular State and the federal 
schedules.  Accordingly, the BIA affirmed the order of 
removal. 
 
Rojas then filed a motion for stay of removal in this 
Court, which we granted, and this petition for review of the 
BIA‟s decision. 
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
  The IJ had jurisdiction over Rojas‟s removal 
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. The BIA had 
jurisdiction to review the IJ‟s order of removal and its 
underlying denial of Rojas‟s motion to terminate under 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. 
 
 We generally have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 
to review final orders of removal.  However, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction 
to review any final order of removal against an alien who is 
removable” for having been convicted of violating a law 
“relating to a controlled substance” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Although the BIA‟s order falls within this 
jurisdiction-stripping provision, we retain jurisdiction to 
ascertain our jurisdiction, i.e., to determine “(1) whether the 
petitioner is an alien and (2) whether he has been convicted of 
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one of the enumerated offenses.”  Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 
F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in 
any other provision of this chapter . . . which limits or 
eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding 
review of . . . questions of law raised upon a petition for 
review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance 
with this section.”).    
 
We need not decide the standard of review applicable 
to the BIA‟s unpublished decision in this case.  See De Leon-
Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 348-51 & n.5 (3d Cir. 
2010).  We reach the same conclusion regardless of whether 
we review the BIA‟s decision de novo, see, e.g., Denis v. 
Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2011) (suggesting 
de novo review is proper in a case, such as this, involving a 
pure legal issue as to removability), or whether we review it 
under the deferential Chevron standard, see id. (recognizing 
that deference to an agency‟s reasonable interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory language would be appropriate). 
 
III.  THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS  
 
A. Rojas’s Contentions 
 
In his petition for review, Rojas reiterates the simple 
argument he has advanced throughout these proceedings: that 
the INA “quite unambiguously requires” that, “in order to 
prove deportability under [section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the 
Department] must show that Mr. Rojas‟s criminal conviction 
was for possession of a substance that is . . . contained in the 
federal schedules of the [CSA].”  Pet‟r‟s Br. at 12, 14.  He 
further argues that his particular conviction does not meet this 
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requirement given that Pennsylvania criminalizes substances 
that are not illegal under federal law and that the Department 
did not identify the substance underlying his state-law 
conviction as a federally controlled substance.   
 
B. The Department’s View 
 
The Department instead frames the question as 
“whether a (generic) conviction under [Pennsylvania‟s 
paraphernalia law] . . . constitutes „a violation of . . . any law 
. . . of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined 
in section 802 of Title 21).‟”  Resp‟t‟s Br. at 13.  The 
Department contends that the answer to this question lies in 
the application of the “formal categorical approach,” under 
which the issue “becomes whether a generic conviction for 
drug paraphernalia . . . is a close enough „fit‟ to federal 
controlled substances.”  Id. at 17-18.  The Department further 
posits that generic paraphernalia offenses do “fit,” regardless 
of the controlled substance involved. 
 
But, even if we assume that the Department is correct 
that drug-paraphernalia statutes “relate to” controlled 
substances, a point which Rojas concedes, see, e.g., Oral Arg. 
at 9:30-9:35 (May 29, 2013), that does not address the 
straightforward question of statutory interpretation we must 
tackle on the effect of the parenthetical “(as defined in section 
802 of Title 21)” on the Department‟s burden of proof.  Does 
it require the Department to show that the noncitizen‟s 
conviction involved a substance that is “defined in section 
802 of Title 21”?4  The Department argues that there is no 
need to show what substance was involved or whether it was 
                                                          
4
  We refer to this language as the “„as defined‟ 
parenthetical,” or sometimes simply as “the parenthetical.” 
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listed in the federal schedules so long as there is a “close” fit 
between those schedules and Pennsylvania‟s.  Resp‟t‟s Br. at 
19.  In other words, the Department contends that a 
noncitizen may be removed for a drug offense involving a 
substance that only a state criminalizes, so long as that state‟s 
schedules approximate the CSA schedules. 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A. The Language of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
 
1. Textual Canons of Statutory Interpretation 
 
In cases of statutory interpretation, “we begin by 
looking at the terms of the provisions [at issue] and the 
„commonsense conception‟ of those terms.”  Carachuri-
Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2585 (2010) (citing 
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006)).  As the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized, in “all” cases “[t]he inquiry 
ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous.”  Barnhart v. 
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  Thus, to determine whether 
§ 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the INA requires that a federally 
controlled substance underlie a state-law drug conviction, we 
turn first to the text of the law itself, which, as noted earlier, 
provides that: 
 
Any alien who at any time after admission has 
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy 
or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a 
State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21), other than a single 
12 
 
offense involving possession for one‟s own use 
of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable. 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added).   
 
Reading the statute as written, it is clear that the 
parenthetical “(as defined in section 802 of Title 21)” is a 
restrictive modifier that affects only its immediate antecedent 
term, “a controlled substance.”  As the Seventh Circuit has 
explained, the parenthetical “can only be read to modify 
„controlled substance,‟ its immediate antecedent,” and thus 
“bridges the state law crimes with federal definitions of what 
counts as a controlled substance.”  Desai v. Mukasey, 520 
F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Disabled in Action v. 
SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 201 n.13 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining 
that under the “„rule of the last antecedent‟ . . . [,] „a limiting 
clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying 
only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows‟” (quoting 
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003))).
5
  
 
Thus, the most straightforward reading of 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is that to establish removability the 
Department must show that “a controlled substance” included 
in the definition of substances in section 802 of Title 21 was 
involved in the crime of conviction at issue.  Parsing the 
different clauses with the aid of the “last antecedent” canon 
reveals that, as a whole, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires the 
                                                          
5
  Desai interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 
whose language is identical to § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) in all 
material respects.  We analyze interchangeably provisions of 
the INA containing identical language.  See IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005).  
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Department to establish that the individual it seeks to remove 
(1) is an alien (2) who at any time after entering the country 
violated or attempted to violate a law relating to a controlled 
substance and (3) that the controlled substance is defined as 
such by federal law.  Points (1) and (2) are not at issue in this 
case. 
 
A simple example further illustrates why this reading 
of the statute is correct.  Section 802(6) of Title 21 states that 
“[t]he term „controlled substance‟ means a drug or other 
substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, 
III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter.  The term does not 
include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco . . . 
.”  Putting the two provisions together, the INA effectively 
renders removable noncitizens convicted under laws “relating 
to a controlled substance („a drug or other substance . . . 
included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V . . . [,] not includ[ing] 
spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco‟).”  Suppose, then, 
that Pennsylvania—which has its own controlled-substances 
schedules to which it is free to add substances not in the 
federal lists—chose to include tobacco in its schedules, and 
that Rojas was convicted of possessing tobacco paraphernalia.  
Given the express exclusion of tobacco from the federal list 
of controlled substances, it would be a complete anomaly to 
then place Rojas in removal proceedings for possessing 
tobacco paraphernalia.  Indeed, such a result would violate 
the cardinal principle that we do not cripple statutes by 
rendering words therein superfluous, as the Department‟s 
reading would have us do to the “as defined” parenthetical.  
See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“It is 
our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word 
of a statute.” (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 
528, 538-39 (1955) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
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Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“We strive to avoid a result that would render 
statutory language superfluous, meaningless, or irrelevant.”). 
 
 2. Relevant Case Law 
 
We find further support for this construction in the 
decision of the Ninth Circuit—the first Court of Appeals to 
have squarely addressed the meaning of the “as defined” 
parenthetical—which concluded as we do that the language 
means that the Department must establish that a state-law 
drug conviction involved a federally controlled substance.  
Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) 
abrogation on other grounds recognized by Cardozo-Arias v. 
Holder, 495 F. App‟x 790, 792 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012).  In that 
case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that to hold otherwise would 
“read out of the statute the explicit reference to Section [8]02 
of [Title 21].”  Id. at 1077 n.5.  It therefore reversed the BIA‟s 
order of removability because the Department had not 
introduced evidence to show what substance Ruiz-Vidal had 
been convicted of possessing.  Id. at 1080; see also Cheuk 
Fung S-Yong v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(applying Ruiz-Vidal to a conviction under a California 
statute criminalizing transportation of controlled substances, 
where the Department failed to establish whether a federally 
controlled substance was involved).  The Seventh Circuit 
agreed, noting that the “as defined” parenthetical means that 
if “a state decides to outlaw the distribution of jelly beans, 
then it would have no effect on one‟s immigration status to 
deal jelly beans, because it is not related to a controlled 
substance listed in the federal CSA.”  Desai, 520 F.3d at 766.  
This case follows from the holdings in Ruiz-Vidal and S-Yong 
and from the reasoning in Desai. 
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3. The Views of the Department and the BIA in 
Other Contexts 
 
In addition to being supported by the statute‟s plain 
text and persuasive case law, our proposed reading of the 
statute has been accepted by the BIA.  Almost fifty years ago, 
the BIA terminated removal proceedings against an alien 
convicted under California law of selling a “narcotic” because 
although the “California law relate[d] to a narcotic or 
marihuana violation[,] . . . the record being silent as to the 
narcotic involved . . . [,] it [was] possible that the conviction 
involved a substance (such as peyote) which is a narcotic 
under California law but [wa]s not defined as a narcotic drug 
under federal law.”  Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274, 
275 (BIA 1965).  Analyzing a predecessor to 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the BIA held that “only a conviction for 
illicit possession of . . . a substance which is defined as a 
narcotic drug under federal laws can be the basis for 
deportation proceedings.”  Id. at 276.  The BIA here 
completely ignored Paulus. 
 
This reading has also been advocated by the 
Department itself.  In Ruiz-Vidal, the Department conceded 
that it was required to show that the conviction at issue was 
for possession of a substance “not only listed in the California 
statute . . . but also contained in . . . the Controlled Substances 
Act.”  Ruiz-Vidal, 473 F.3d at 1077 n.3.  Similarly, the 
Department has argued to this Court that the parenthetical 
means that the controlled substance “must be one defined 
under [the CSA]” in order for the state conviction to satisfy 
the INA‟s provisions.  Br. for Resp‟t at 19, Gul v. Att’y Gen., 
385 F. App‟x 241 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-2675), 2009 WL 
8584678, at *19.  And, in this very case, while focused on 
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whether paraphernalia statutes “relate to” controlled 
substances, the Department perhaps unwittingly conceded 
that Rojas‟s reading of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is correct, noting, 
for example, that the parenthetical “is restrictive, [and] 
modifies the immediate antecedent—the term „controlled 
substance,‟” Resp‟t‟s Br. at 16, and that the law requires that 
the “statute of conviction „relate to‟ federal controlled 
substances,” id. at 21 (emphasis added).  Thus, the 
Department‟s resistance to the notion that a federally 
controlled substance must be involved is, to say the least, 
perplexing. 
 
Unfazed, the Department urges us not to follow Ruiz-
Vidal or Paulus, relying primarily on Matter of Espinoza, 25 
I. & N. Dec. 118 (BIA 2009), for the proposition that the 
holding of those cases should be limited to convictions that 
involve actual possession of controlled substances.  We are 
not persuaded.   
 
Espinoza involved an individual who was subject to, 
but sought cancellation of, removal, which could be granted 
upon a showing that the individual had not been convicted of 
any law “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21).”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  
Despite his conviction for possessing a marijuana pipe, 
Espinoza argued that the Department could not “support a 
finding of inadmissibility unless the paraphernalia was tied to 
a specific, federally controlled substance.”  Espinoza, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. at 121.  The BIA disagreed, noting both that the 
conviction was for “possessing a marijuana pipe, [so] th[e] 
argument ha[d] little relevance,” and that because it was 
Espinoza‟s burden to prove eligibility for adjustment of 
status, he had the “burden to resolve any issue that might 
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arise in his case by virtue of an asymmetry between the 
Federal and State . . . schedules.”  Id.  These two grounds 
alone factually and legally distinguish Espinoza. 
 
But, to the extent that Espinoza intended to limit the 
Department‟s obligation to establish a federally controlled 
substance only to those proceedings based on drug 
“possessory” offenses (or to the extent that the Department 
reads Espinoza in that way), we disagree with the illogical 
and atextual interpretation of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) that this view 
compels.  We cannot surmise from the text any support for 
the proposition that the Department‟s burden of proof 
changes depending on the type of drug offense involved in 
the removal proceeding, and, indeed, the statute speaks of 
“any” law.  Moreover, common sense indicates that there 
should be no difference—we cannot square the text of the law 
with a world in which a noncitizen may be deported for using 
“1-(3-trifluoromethylpheny)piperazine” paraphernalia, but 
not for “possessing” the drug itself.  And there is nothing in 
Espinoza, let alone in § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), to help us logically 
determine which offenses are “possessory” and which are not.  
Espinoza‟s purported limitation of Ruiz-Vidal to “possessory” 
offenses has been undermined by subsequent decisions 
applying that case to crimes that may or may not require 
actual possession of drugs.  See, e.g., Mielewczyk v. Holder, 
575 F.3d 992, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2009) (involving the crime of 
offering to transport drugs); S-Yong, 600 F.3d at 1031, 1034 
(addressing conviction for transporting and attempting to 
transport controlled substances).  The better view is that the 
parenthetical captures all controlled-substances offenses—
any offense involving a particular drug (possessing it, 
18 
 
transporting it, using paraphernalia in connection with it, etc.) 
is removable if the drug is on the federal list.
6
    
 
4. The Department’s Alternative Reading of the 
Parenthetical 
 
The Department offers one last alternative, urging that 
because the statute speaks of a conviction “relating to a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21),” 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added), all that is 
                                                          
6
  In Espinoza, the BIA also rejected the notion that a 
paraphernalia conviction cannot lead to removal because 
there is no federal drug-paraphernalia statute.  The BIA 
reasoned that the “as defined” parenthetical “modifies only its 
immediate antecedent (i.e., „controlled substance‟), not the 
whole text of the section” and therefore does not impose a 
requirement that the crime of conviction “relate to” a 
federally defined crime.  Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 122 
(citing Escobar Barraza v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 388, 390 (7th 
Cir. 2008)).  We agree, but are at a loss as to why, given its 
view that the parenthetical modifies the immediate antecedent 
term, the BIA does not agree that the controlled substance at 
issue must be included in the federal schedules.  These 
contradictory lines of reasoning stand in stark contrast to the 
Ninth and Seventh Circuits‟ more internally consistent views.  
Both Circuits recognize, as per Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911 
(9th Cir. 2000), and Escobar Barraza, respectively, that 
paraphernalia statutes “relate to” controlled substances 
despite the existence of the “as defined” parenthetical.  At the 
same time, both recognize, as per Ruiz-Vidal and Desai, that a 
conviction must involve a federally controlled drug because 
of the parenthetical. 
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required is that the substance of conviction “relate to” a 
federally controlled substance, or that a particular State‟s 
schedules as a whole “relate to” the CSA.  Stated differently, 
under this view the statute requires establishing only that the 
State schedules and/or the particular substance involved are 
sufficiently “close” to the federal substances if the match is 
not “exact.”  Resp‟t‟s Br. at 20; see also Oral Arg. 18:00-
18:15 (Oct. 5, 2012) (arguing that the parenthetical only 
requires that the substances in the State schedules are related 
“in kind” to those in the federal schedules).  This theory 
presumably disposes of any requirement that the substance of 
conviction be established when the offense of removal is a 
drug crime of any state or territory in our Circuit, to the extent 
we believe that all of a particular jurisdiction‟s controlled 
substances, or its schedules as a whole, are “close to” or 
“relate to” the federal lists.  But this reading of 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) does not comport with plain grammar and 
leads to results Congress could not have intended.   
 
In essence, the Department‟s proposal is to re-read the 
statute to say that removable convictions are those “relating to 
a controlled substance (relating closely (or in kind) to a 
substance defined in section 802 of Title 21).”  We reject this 
artificial redraft—we will not construe “relating to” to modify 
more than one clause and we will not arbitrarily insert into the 
text the words “close to” or “in kind.”  Cf. Lopez, 549 U.S. at 
56 (rejecting a convoluted rewriting of a statute from “a 
felony punishable under the CSA” to “a felony punishable 
under the CSA whether or not as a felony”). 
   
Moreover, the “close to” test would require 
immigration agencies and federal courts to become lab 
experts capable of determining whether any substance 
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criminalized by any given State, such as 1-(3-
trifluoromethylphenyl)piperazine, is “close to” or “relates to” 
any of the hundreds of substances listed in the CSA 
schedules.   Yet we are left to our own devices to ascertain 
the precise contours of this new “close to” test and whether it 
turns on chemical, medicinal, physical, or other as-of-yet-
unknown properties of drugs.
7
 
 
And the “close to” test would fare no better if applied 
to the totality of a particular state‟s schedules—i.e., if the 
import of the argument were to permit removal without 
showing that a particular federal drug was involved so long as 
a state‟s schedules are, as a whole, sufficiently “close to” the 
federal schedules, or if a “vast number” or “many” of the 
state‟s substances appear in the CSA, see Dissenting Op. at 
11.  It is left unexplained just how many substances a state 
                                                          
7
  The dissent dismisses this concern by referring to jelly 
beans as a “harmless product” and by noting that if a state 
included tobacco in its definition of controlled substances we 
would be spared having to make these difficult 
determinations by a Supremacy or Commerce Clause 
challenge to the problematic state statute.  See Dissenting Op. 
at 15 note 3.  But jelly beans and tobacco are merely two 
poignant examples.  States have in actuality criminalized 
substances at various times that are not as easily dismissed as 
jelly beans, such as peyote.  See Paulus 11 I. & N. Dec. at 
275.  And, like the Department, our dissenting colleagues 
offer no doctrinal way to distinguish between removing Rojas 
today, despite the lack of a federally controlled substance, and 
not removing individuals convicted of possessing non-
federally controlled substances tomorrow. 
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would have to include in its lists that are not in the federal 
lists before its drug-related offenses would no longer qualify 
as removable offenses, or whether inclusion of a particularly 
odd substance (such as jelly beans or large sugary beverages) 
would suffice.  We doubt Congress included a specific 
reference to the federal schedules only to have removability 
turn on these unworkable inquiries.
8
 
 
Finally, the Department‟s reading would result in a 
patchwork of removability rules dependent on the whims of 
the legislatures of the fifty states—effectively permitting 
them to control who may remain in the country via their 
controlled-substances schedules—not to mention the laws of 
all foreign nations, which may ban substances that are 
commonplace in the United States, such as poppy seeds.  
Although Congress has, on occasion, allowed non-uniformity 
by tying immigration consequences to state law, here the 
explicit reference to section 802 of Title 21 shows that 
Congress has “pegged the immigration statutes to the 
classifications Congress itself chose. . . .  [I]t is just not 
plausible that Congress meant to authorize a State to overrule 
                                                          
8
  This proposed reading of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), that 
“relating to” modifies both “controlled substances” as well as 
the parenthetical, is also at odds with the Department and the 
BIA‟s view that the parenthetical may only modify the 
immediate antecedent term “controlled substance” but not 
“relating to.”  See supra note 6.  What is good for the goose 
must be good for the gander—either the clauses of the text 
modify more than one term or they do not.  We reject the 
Department‟s view of the shifting transitive powers of the 
different clauses of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).   
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its judgment about the consequences of . . . offenses to which 
its immigration law expressly refers.”  Lopez, 549 U.S. at 58-
59; see also Desai, 520 F.3d at 766 (reasoning that because of 
the parenthetical, states do not have “free rein to define their 
criminal laws in a manner that would allow them to . . . 
determine who is permitted to enter and live in the country”);  
cf. Lozano v. City of Hazelton, __ F.3d __, No. 07-3531, 2013 
WL 3855549, at *13 (3d Cir. July 26, 2013) (highlighting 
“the important national interests that are implicated when 
local governments attempt to regulate immigration and the 
concomitant need to leave such regulation in the hands of the 
federal government”).9   
 
* * * 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the text of 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires the Department to establish that a 
foreign national‟s conviction is both (1) under a law relating 
to a controlled substance, and (2) involved or implicated a 
drug defined in section 802 of Title 21.  This reading gives 
effect to all words of the statute and, in our view, most 
comports with Congress‟s intent in drafting the law.  Because 
the undisputed documents before the IJ contain no such 
                                                          
9
  We agree with the Department that Congress may 
choose to remove noncitizens who violate the controlled-
substances laws of other nations or of the states, even if those 
jurisdictions choose to criminalize substances different than 
Congress chose.  See Oral Arg. at 54:54-55:10 (May 29, 
2013).  But, if it wishes to do so, Congress must excise the 
explicit reference to federally controlled substances from the 
statute. 
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showing, the record is defective and the order of removal is 
invalid. 
 
B. Other Interpretative Mechanisms to Construe 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
Of course, the rule of the last antecedent, like most 
canons of construction, is not absolute.  Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 
26.  But the Department offers no “other indicia of meaning” 
from the text to convince us not to follow it.  Id.  Instead, 
following its focus on “relating to” rather than the “as 
defined” parenthetical, the Department posits that the answer 
to the question of whether a drug-paraphernalia statute 
“relates to” controlled substances is provided by the 
analytical doctrine known as the “formal categorical 
approach.”  See, e.g., Resp‟t‟s Br. at 13 (citing Singh v. 
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 2004)).  The Department 
contends that the cases applying that doctrine also 
demonstrate that the “as defined” parenthetical is of little 
consequence and that a conviction for a non-federally 
controlled substance may result in removal.  Rojas counters 
that a variant known as the “modified categorical approach” 
should govern.  The parties also spar about whether cases 
construing the words “relating to” in statutes such as 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) demonstrate that the parenthetical is 
irrelevant. 
 
We address these contentions in some detail because 
they ignore long-standing rules governing when such 
approaches may be applied and reflect a fundamental 
misunderstanding of those rules as delineated by the Supreme 
Court and by our Court. 
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1. The Formal Categorical and Modified 
Categorical Approaches  
 
It is well-established that the categorical approach is a 
method often used to ascertain whether a prior conviction 
“fits” the definition of a generic federal predicate offense for 
purposes of certain immigration or sentencing consequences.  
The archetypical case is Taylor v. United States, where the 
issue was whether a past state burglary conviction constituted 
a “burglary” as that term is used in the Armed Career 
Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (“ACCA”), thus 
triggering certain sentencing enhancements under the ACCA.  
495 U.S. 575, 578-79 (1990).  The Supreme Court held that 
the proper method to answer the question is the categorical 
approach, which requires a court to determine only whether a 
conviction under the state statute “necessarily” contained all 
of the elements of the federal baseline offense, “burglary,” by 
comparing the elements of the state and federal crimes.  
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02.  The Court has explained that in 
performing that comparison, the court must assume that the 
state law conviction “rested upon [no]thing more than the 
least of the[] acts” criminalized by state law.  See Johnson v. 
United States, 559 U.S. 133, 136-37 (2010).  The 
methodology may also be used to determine whether a past 
offense “fits” a crime listed in the INA.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. 
Dueñas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185-87 (2007) (determining 
whether a past conviction constitutes a “theft offense”).  
  
It is also a fundamental rule that courts applying the 
categorical approach may not delve into the particular facts of 
a conviction to ascertain if there is a proper fit.  See Taylor, 
495 U.S. at 599-602.  The Department urges that this rule 
disposes of any requirement that a federally controlled 
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substance must be involved in any given conviction for 
purposes of determining whether that conviction qualifies as a 
removable offense under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 
With this line of reasoning, the Department seems to 
imply that the categorical approach is the proper rubric of 
analysis every time we are required to determine whether a 
conviction fits into the definition of a crime referenced in the 
INA, or at the very least whether it fits into 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  This view is deeply flawed.  Recently, the 
Supreme Court explained that the categorical approach 
applies when one must compare the defendant‟s or the 
noncitizen‟s conviction to a “generic crime” such as 
“burglary” or “theft.”  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 
1684-85 (2013) (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 37 
(2009), aff’g 523 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2008)).  We made a 
similar point almost ten years ago, noting that we had 
generally applied the element-by-element comparison of the 
categorical approach in “cases interpreting relatively unitary 
categorical concepts—like „forgery‟ . . . „burglary‟ . . . or 
„crime of violence.‟”  Singh, 383 F.3d at 161.10 
 
But not one of these cases involves a determination of 
whether a state offense is one “relating to” controlled 
                                                          
10
  In the years since Singh, we have consistently applied 
the categorical approach to see whether a state crime fits into 
generic, unitary crimes such as “serious drug offenses,” 
United States v. Tucker, 703 F.3d 205, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2012); 
a “drug trafficking crime,” Thomas v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 
134, 142-44 (3d Cir. 2010); or the “sexual abuse of a minor,” 
Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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substances (or “relating to” anything else), and, needless to 
say, none involves an interpretation of the meaning of the “as 
defined” parenthetical.  Thus, it is unsurprising that despite its 
repeated invocation of the categorical approach to analyze 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the Department cannot maintain that the 
law—which refers broadly to crimes “relating to” controlled 
substances—lists any discrete offense against which 
Pennsylvania‟s paraphernalia statute can be compared.  
Accordingly, even assuming that the question presented in 
this case was whether drug-paraphernalia statutes “relat[e] to” 
controlled substances, the formal categorical approach would 
not apply. 
 
 It is true that the categorical approach permits a slight 
deviation, known as the modified categorical approach, from 
the baseline rule that an inquiring court may not look into the 
particular circumstances of a conviction.  When a statute of 
conviction lists elements in the alternative, some of which fit 
the federal definition and some of which do not, a court is 
permitted “to consult a limited class of documents . . . to 
determine which alternative formed the basis of the 
defendant‟s prior conviction.”  Descamps v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).
11
   
                                                          
11
  The basic example is when a state defines “burglary” 
as “breaking and entering” into a vehicle or a dwelling.  
Because only breaking into a dwelling meets the generic 
federal definition, the statute of conviction does not 
categorically fit within the federal crime, but the modified 
categorical approach may provide an answer.  See, e.g., 
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599-602 (addressing this example).  
Contrary to the dissent‟s admonition, our decision in Evanson 
v. Attorney General does not support the proposition that we 
27 
 
But it is simply not the case that the modified 
categorical approach fills the void, or provides a blanket 
invitation for a court to inquire into the facts underlying a 
conviction every time the categorical approach does not 
provide an answer.  As the Supreme Court recently explained, 
the methodology is simply “a mechanism for making th[e] 
comparison [required by the formal categorical approach] 
when a[n underlying] statute lists multiple, alternative 
elements, and so effectively creates „several different . . . 
crimes.‟”  Id. at 2285 (last alteration in original) (quoting 
Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41).
12
  Indeed, given that the modified 
categorical approach is merely a “tool for implementing the 
                                                                                                                                  
“could” apply the categorical approach in this case.  See 
Dissenting Op. at 5 (quoting 550 F.3d 284, 290 (3d Cir. 
2008)).  In Evanson, we applied the categorical (and modified 
categorical) approach to determine whether a conviction fit 
another generic, unitary crime, namely, an “aggravated 
felony” under the INA.  Evanson, 550 F.3d at 291-92. 
 
12
  Descamps construed a provision of the ACCA, not the 
INA.  The BIA has stated its view that it may apply the 
modified categorical approach more broadly in the context of 
the INA than whatever is mandated by courts construing the 
ACCA.  See Matter of Lanferman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 721, 728 
(BIA 2012).  But we have rejected any notion that the 
analysis is different depending on whether the federal 
baseline statute resides in the INA or the ACCA.  See, e.g., 
Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 478-80 (3d Cir. 
2009).  And the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Moncrieffe and 
Descamps, both analyzing interchangeably INA and ACCA 
cases, make clear that Lanferman has been abrogated. 
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categorical approach,” id. at 2284, then, by definition, it has 
nothing to say in cases—such as this one—where the 
categorical approach itself is irrelevant.  Moreover, 
Pennsylvania‟s paraphernalia statute is not phrased in the 
disjunctive, with some elements satisfying the federal 
baseline offense and some not—it does not “effectively 
create[] „several different crimes‟”—so one could not employ 
the modified categorical approach in any event.  Id. at 2285.
13
 
   
Thus, the modified categorical approach does not 
apply in this case.  Here, we derive the obligation to establish 
the existence of a federally controlled substance simply from 
the text of the law.  Our holding is not an invitation to inquire 
into or relitigate the circumstances underlying every drug 
conviction—the existence of a federally controlled substance 
will be established in the same way as the existence of the 
conviction itself is normally established.
14
   
                                                          
13
  Courts are permitted to depart from the categorical 
approach and “relating to” cases entirely “when the terms of 
the statute invite inquiry into the facts underlying the 
conviction at issue.”  Singh, 383 F.3d at 161; see, e.g., 
Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 392-93 (determining whether a 
conviction constitutes an offense that “involves fraud or 
deceit in which the loss . . . exceeds $10,000” (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)).  There is no contention that the 
removability conduct at issue in § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) implicates 
the rationale of cases like Nijhawan. 
 
14
  Were we to insist on fitting the question presented here 
into the categorical approach, odd results would follow.  Even 
if we could somehow subject Pennsylvania‟s drug-
paraphernalia statute to an element-by-element comparison 
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 2. Cases Involving “Relating to” Statutes 
 
In addition to cases that apply the formal/modified 
categorical approach, a parallel but distinct line of cases has 
developed to address situations in which the relevant federal 
conduct is presented not as a generic, unitary crime but as a 
conviction “relating to” other crimes or objects.  In these 
cases, courts do not require a strict element-by-element match 
between the offense of conviction and the federal baseline, 
the hallmark of the categorical approach.  Instead, the inquiry 
focuses on the nature of the defendant‟s conviction, and 
whether it “stand[s] in relation,” “pertain[s],” has “bearing of 
concern,” or “refer[s]” to the object or crime of comparison.  
Desai, 520 F.3d at 764 (quoting Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)).   
 
We used this form of analysis, for example, in Denis v. 
Attorney General to determine whether a state conviction for 
tampering with physical evidence constituted a crime 
                                                                                                                                  
against some federal offense, we would be forced to conclude 
that the drug-paraphernalia statute “sweeps more broadly” 
than federal drug statutes do, Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283, 
because Pennsylvania criminalizes substances that are not 
illegal under federal law.  Under the categorical approach, 
then, the “inquiry [would be] over” and no examination of the 
underlying conviction possible.  Id. at 2286.  Under this 
improbable application of the categorical approach, many 
drug offenses under Pennsylvania law could never constitute 
a removable offense, unless, say, they contain as an element a 
specific substance that is federally controlled.  This plainly 
incorrect result demonstrates that the categorical approach is 
a red herring here. 
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“relating to obstruction of justice.”  633 F.3d 201, 204 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  We held that it did, not because of any “precise 
degree of similarity between the elements of Denis‟s offense 
and a listed federal crime,” but rather based on the 
“interrelationship” between the state statute and “obstruction 
of justice.”  Id. at 212; see also Yong Wong Park v. Att’y 
Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 72 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that whether a 
statute of conviction is one “relating to counterfeiting” 
depends on whether it “seeks to discourage the act of 
counterfeiting” (citation and internal alteration omitted)).15 
   
To be sure, this line of cases would provide the proper 
rubric of analysis if the question at issue was whether 
paraphernalia statutes “relate to” controlled substances, which 
neither party contests.  But the Department asks us to 
                                                          
15
  Indeed, many cases deciding whether a statute “relates 
to” drugs involve statutes of conviction that have no exact 
federal analog, making impossible the comparison of 
elements that the categorical approach requires.  See, e.g., 
Luu-Le, 224 F.3d at 915 (concluding that a state paraphernalia 
statute “relates to” controlled substances not on the basis of 
the categorical approach, but rather because “[t]he statute 
makes abundantly clear that an object is not drug 
paraphernalia unless it is in some way linked to drugs”); 
Desai, 520 F.3d at 765 (holding that a state statute 
criminalizing the sale of drug look-alike substances, a law 
with no federal-law analog, “relates to” controlled substances 
not based on a comparison of elements, but because a 
conviction for a drug look-alike substance “would not even 
exist as a legal (or linguistic) concept without its connection” 
to drugs). 
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extrapolate the “relating to” cases to conclude that so long as 
a state‟s controlled-substances schedules “show[] substantial 
(and obviously intentional) overlap” with the federal 
schedules, a drug-paraphernalia conviction satisfies the 
removability provision of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) even if the actual 
substance involved is not evident from the record of 
conviction.  Resp‟t‟s 28(j) Letter at 1-2, Aug. 22, 2012.  This 
we decline to do.  The proposed use of the “relating to” cases 
is merely a repackaged version of the argument that “relating 
to” modifies both “controlled substance” as well as the “as 
defined” parenthetical, a reading we have already rejected.  In 
other words, the invitation to read “relating to” as modifying 
the parenthetical is but a thinly-veiled suggestion that we 
permit those words to excise the parenthetical entirely.  Supra 
Parts IV.A.1, 4. 
 
 3. Our Decision in Borrome v. Attorney General 
  
The Department and the dissent also rely extensively 
on Borrome v. Attorney General for the idea that the 
substance involved in Rojas‟s offense is irrelevant, but that 
case did not address the effect of the “as defined” 
parenthetical and is thus not controlling here.  If anything, 
Borrome most clearly demonstrates the differences between 
the categorical approach and the “relating to” line of cases.  
In that sense, far from “repudiating” Borrome, Dissenting Op. 
at 15, we embrace it. 
 
Borrome was convicted under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) of engaging in the unauthorized 
distribution of certain prescription drugs, and we had to 
determine whether the FDCA conviction was a “drug 
trafficking crime,” and/or whether the FDCA statute was one 
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“relating to” controlled substances under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  
687 F.3d at 152-53.  In answering the first question, we 
applied the categorical approach to determine whether the 
elements of the FDCA conviction corresponded to the 
elements of a generic “drug trafficking crime.”  See id. at 
155-59.  In answering the second question, we relied on the 
“broad ordinary meaning” of the words “relating to” and 
focused on the “range of behavior” targeted by the FDCA.  
Id. at 160-62.
16
  Borrome thus aptly illustrates our application 
of the first question we must ask under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i): 
whether a statute of conviction criminalizes conduct “relating 
to” controlled substances.  See also Luu-Le, 224 F.3d at 915 
(describing a law that relates to controlled substances as one 
                                                          
16
  While in Borrome we also referenced the categorical 
approach when analyzing this second question, we did so in 
rejecting the IJ‟s consideration of the particular facts of the 
petitioner‟s underlying conviction.  See 687 F.3d at 159-60 & 
n.7.  But in no way does Borrome support the Department‟s 
contention that the categorical approach is the proper rubric 
of analysis in all of these cases.  Indeed, while we also made 
reference to the categorical approach in Denis, in that case we 
in reality engaged in traditional “relating to” analysis, as 
indicated earlier at Part IV.B.2.  See Denis, 633 F.3d at 211-
12 (explaining that “[t]o give effect to Congress‟s choice of 
language, a categorical matching of the elements of the 
offense of conviction with the elements of a federal law 
cannot be the sole test for determining whether a crime of 
conviction „relates to‟ a generic federal offense,” and 
concluding that an offense for tampering with evidence 
“bears a close resemblance to . . . obstruction of justice” and 
thus constituted a crime “relating to obstruction of justice”). 
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that “is plainly intended to criminalize behavior involving the 
production or use of drugs”).  But, because we concluded that 
the FDCA was not a law “relating to” a controlled substance, 
we stated that the substance underlying the conviction in 
Borrome was irrelevant.  In other words, we did not have 
occasion in Borrome to address the meaning of the “as 
defined” parenthetical.17 
 
Moreover, in concluding that the FDCA conviction did 
not relate to the CSA, we noted in Borrome that the FDCA 
prohibits “countless activities that are completely 
unconnected to controlled substances” and also that the 
connection between the substances listed in the CSA and 
those at issue in the FDCA was “not at all evident from the 
face of [the statute] and only emerges after a journey through 
other laws.”  687 F.3d at 162.  The reference to the two 
schedules showed simply that the one common link between 
the FDCA and the CSA, the overlap in some of the 
substances at issue under each, was itself so attenuated that it 
did not warrant finding that FDCA offenses “relate to” CSA 
offenses.  Id. at 161-63.  Thus, contrary to the Department 
and the dissent‟s admonitions, see Dissenting Op. at 6-11, 15-
16, Borrome does not stand for the idea that the level of 
correspondence between the federal schedules and a state‟s 
schedules with respect to its drug laws is outcome-
determinative.   
                                                          
17
  Similarly, despite the Department‟s extensive reliance 
on Luu-Le, Luu-Le only addressed whether a drug 
paraphernalia statute was a law “relating to” a controlled 
substance, and did not reach the “as defined” parenthetical.  
224 F.3d at 915. 
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* * * 
 
The bottom line with respect to the foregoing analysis 
is that not one of the categorical approach cases addresses the 
effect of the “as defined” parenthetical of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
on the Department‟s burden of proof.  Instead, they dictate 
only how exact the match between an underlying statute of 
conviction and a federal baseline offense has to be in order to 
satisfy federal law.  The same is true of a common theme that 
unites the categorical approach and the “relating to” cases—
the rule that the existence of a conviction is established not by 
reference to the underlying facts of a case but by reference to 
the underlying statute.  Although the Department and the 
dissent seek to import that rule into this case, the rule merely 
explains how the Department must meet its burden, not what 
that burden is.  There is simply no doctrinal basis to transform 
any of these rules into a mechanism to lessen the 
Department‟s burden altogether or to use them to read a 
clause entirely out of the removability statute.  And the 
existence of these diverse rules, applicable depending on how 
the INA phrases the baseline offense, highlights an important 
point: the text of the law is always paramount.  The wording 
of the baseline crime always dictates the proper method of 
analysis.  We ought not turn that principle on its head by 
letting the different methodologies contort the words of the 
statute.
18
 
                                                          
18
  We decline to follow Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995 
(8th Cir. 2013), on which the Department relies, because it 
wrongly assumed that the “categorical approach” is the 
proper focus of the “relating to” inquiry.  Id. at 1000-01.  
Moreover, although the Mellouli petitioner conceded that 
35 
 
 
C. Rojas’s Remedy 
 
 We now address the proper remedy—whether to 
reverse the BIA‟s ruling or to remand the case to the BIA so 
that it may determine in the first instance whether to further 
remand to the IJ to give the Department a proverbial second 
bite at the apple.   
 
The Department asks that, if we determine that 
establishing the involvement of a federally controlled drug 
was required, we remand the case so that it may make the 
adequate showing under the “modified categorical approach.”  
See Resp‟t‟s Br. at 13 n.11.  But we have already concluded 
that application of the categorical approach would, rather than 
counseling a remand, mean that “the inquiry is over.”  
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2286; see also supra note 14.  
Nevertheless, because the Department purports to be able to 
make the required showing in the same way it established the 
existence of the criminal conviction in the first place, we will 
remand the matter to the BIA.  Our remand is solely so that 
the BIA may determine whether it is appropriate to further 
remand the case to the IJ, to permit the Department to make 
the required showing before that agency. 
                                                                                                                                  
paraphernalia statutes generally “relat[e] to” controlled 
substances, id. at 999, the Court nevertheless resorted to cases 
dealing precisely with that question to solve the additional 
issue of whether the Department must establish that a 
federally controlled substance was at issue, without 
addressing cases like Ruiz-Vidal that actually deal with the 
Department‟s burden, see, e.g., id. at 997, 1000 (relying on, 
among others, Luu-Le and Escobar Barraza).   
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To guide the BIA‟s decision, we note the following.  
First, that normally the proper way to establish the fact of a 
conviction is to rely on the so-called Taylor-Shepard 
documents, and we see no reason why the existence of a 
federally controlled substance cannot be similarly established.  
See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 23-24, 26 (2005).  
“[I]n the case of a guilty plea,” these documents consist of 
“the plea agreement, plea colloquy, or some comparable 
judicial record of the factual basis for the plea.”  Moncrieffe, 
133 S. Ct. at 1684 (internal quotation marks omitted).  But we 
have also recognized that a police criminal complaint may 
establish the underlying fact of a conviction to the extent it 
serves as a charging instrument with certain indicia of 
reliability.  See, e.g., Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 292 
(3d Cir. 2006) (so holding when the complaint bore the 
“imprimatur” of the district attorney).  In that regard, 
however, we reiterate that the reliability of the police criminal 
complaint here is already in grave doubt.  For one, it states 
that it was approved by a Commonwealth attorney “via 
phone” in a space where the document appears to require a 
signature from an approving attorney.  Moreover, it was 
prepared in October of 2009, seven months after Rojas‟s 
arrest.  Finally, the affidavit of probable cause attached to the 
complaint inexplicably narrates the arrest of a woman in June 
of 2009 for drunk driving. 
 
Second, the police criminal complaint here implicates 
the Supreme Court‟s recent admonitions to be wary of 
attempts to relitigate prior convictions based on documents 
“the meaning of [which] will often be uncertain,” or when 
“the statements of fact in them may be downright wrong.”  
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2289.  Indeed, charging documents 
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generally implicate the Supreme Court‟s concern that “during 
plea hearings, the defendant may not wish to irk the 
prosecutor or court by squabbling about superfluous factual 
allegations” in a document that does not constitute the basis 
of a defendant‟s actual plea.  Id.  We trust that the BIA will 
consider these points in deciding whether to remand the case 
to the IJ. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The outcome of this case turns on the plain text of 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and, in particular, on the language of the 
parenthetical: “as defined in section 802 of Title 21.”  We 
conclude that this clause means that the controlled-
substances conviction that is the basis of removal must 
involve or relate to a substance “defined in” federal law.  
Most drug convictions will qualify as removable offenses 
under this reading.  Indeed, the guilty plea or jury 
instructions in a Pennsylvania drug-paraphernalia conviction 
will normally list the drug at issue (given that a violation of 
the statute requires the actual or intended presence of a 
specific drug), and most of Pennsylvania‟s drugs are on the 
federal list.  It simply will be a matter of checking if the 
substance at issue is contained in that list.  Thus, “to the 
extent that our rejection of the Government‟s broad 
understanding of the scope of [this statute] may have any 
practical effect on policing our Nation‟s borders, it is a 
limited one.”  Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2589.  And, 
to be sure, Congress may change the trigger of removability 
by altering—or deleting—the contents of the parenthetical.  
Today, we simply give effect to the statute‟s most natural 
reading. 
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We will grant Rojas‟s petition for review and remand 
the case to the BIA for further proceedings in accordance 
with this opinion. 
  1 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 
 As the majority has indicated, this matter is before this 
Court on Ramiro Enrique Rojas‟s petition for review of a 
decision and order of the BIA dated January 17, 2012, 
dismissing his appeal from a decision of an immigration judge 
(“IJ”) dated September 22, 2011.  The case arises from the 
circumstance that a Pennsylvania state court convicted Rojas, a 
citizen of the Dominican Republic and lawful permanent 
resident (“LPR”) of the United States, on the basis of his pleas 
of guilty to state charges of use/possession of drug paraphernalia 
and possession of marijuana.  Thereafter the Department of 
Homeland Security (“Department”) sought to remove Rojas 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) by reason of those 
convictions.  Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that: 
Any alien who at any time after admission has 
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy 
or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a 
State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21), other than a single 
offense involving possession for one's own use of 
30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable. 
 Although the Department later conceded that Rojas‟s 
conviction for possession of marijuana did not render him 
removable because it did not pass the 30-gram statutory 
removable threshold for marijuana, it continued to seek to 
remove him on the basis of his separate conviction involving 
drug paraphernalia.  Rojas filed a notice to terminate the 
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removal proceedings pending against him before an IJ arguing 
that his conviction for use/possession of drug paraphernalia 
under Pennsylvania law did not “relate[] to a controlled 
substance” within the meaning of section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
because the Pennsylvania definition of a controlled substance “is 
more expansive” than that found in 21 U.S.C. § 802 (the 
“Controlled Substances Act” or “CSA”) and thus his conviction 
did not necessarily involve a controlled substance as defined in 
the CSA.  App. at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
this regard, Rojas pointed out that the state court record of his 
conviction did not specify the controlled substance involved in 
his offense.   The IJ denied Rojas‟s motion and sustained the 
controlled substance charge of removability against Rojas and 
issued a removal order.  The BIA dismissed Rojas‟s appeal from 
the IJ‟s decision and Rojas then filed a petition for review with 
this Court.  After a panel of this Court heard oral argument but 
before it issued its opinion the Court on its own initiative 
ordered that the matter be heard by the Court en banc.  
Following argument before the en banc Court, the majority now 
is granting the petition but I am dissenting as I would deny the 
petition for review.
1
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 The majority indicates that it does not matter whether it 
reviews the BIA‟s legal conclusions de novo or reviews them 
under the principles that the Supreme Court set forth in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984), and I agree that the 
scope of review that the Court uses in this case does not matter 
for under any approach this Court should deny the petition for 
review.  Unlike the majority I make scant reference to opinions 
  3 
 Ultimately this case presents a single straightforward 
question:  was Rojas‟s conviction based on his guilty plea under 
35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(32) (West 2003) for 
use/possession of drug paraphernalia a “violation of . . . any law 
of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined by 
section 802 of Title 21)” under section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  
Section 780-113(a)(32) prohibits:  
The use of, or possession with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia for the purpose of planting, 
propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, 
manufacturing, compounding, converting, 
producing, processing, preparing, testing, 
analyzing, packing, repacking, storing, 
containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, 
inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human 
body a controlled substance in violation of this 
act. 
Pennsylvania courts have held that to sustain a conviction 
for possession of drug paraphernalia under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 
780-113(a)(32), “the Commonwealth must establish that the 
items possessed, were used or intended to be used with a 
controlled substance.”  Commonwealth v. Torres, 617 A.2d 812, 
815 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).  Pennsylvania law, in part tracking 
section 780-113(a)(32), broadly provides that “drug 
paraphernalia” means:   
                                                                                                             
from other jurisdictions because the meaning of section 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is clear on its face and in reaching my result I 
simply rely on the text of the law as written. 
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[A]ll equipment, products and materials of any 
kind which are used, intended for use or designed 
for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, 
growing, harvesting, manufacturing, 
compounding, converting, producing, processing, 
preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, 
repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, 
injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise 
introducing into the human body a controlled 
substance in violation of this act. 
35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-102(b) (West 2003).  A “controlled 
substance” in Pennsylvania is “a drug, substance, or immediate 
precursor included in Schedules I through V of [the 
Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and 
Cosmetic Act].”  Id.  Under the CSA in 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) 
“controlled substance” means: 
a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, 
included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B 
of this subchapter.  The term does not include 
distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, 
as those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
 Rojas contends that his conviction does not fall within 
section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because the Department did not 
establish that the CSA includes the unidentified substance 
underlying his state-law paraphernalia conviction as a controlled 
substance.  Specifically, he argues that “in order to prove 
deportability under [section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the Department] 
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must show that Mr. Rojas‟s criminal conviction was for 
possession of a substance that is not only listed under the 
Pennsylvania controlled substance schedules, but also contained 
in the federal schedules of the Controlled Substance Act.”  
Petitioner‟s br. at 14.  Rojas contends that inasmuch as the 
record of his conviction does not identify the substance involved 
in his offense and the Pennsylvania schedules list more 
substances than their federal counterparts, his conviction is not 
necessarily one “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21).”   
To determine whether Rojas‟s drug paraphernalia 
possession conviction renders him removable pursuant to 
section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the Court could “apply a formal 
categorical approach.”2  Evanson v. Att‟y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 
290 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks 
                                                 
2
 Such an application would be consistent with the Supreme 
Court‟s recent holding in Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. __, 
133 S.Ct. 1678 (2013), in which the Court applied the formal 
categorical approach to determine if a conviction for a Georgia 
state offense constituted “illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), and therefore was an 
“aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.  As the Court explained, “[w]hen 
the Government alleges that a state conviction qualifies as an 
„aggravated felony‟ under the INA, [it] generally employ[s] a 
„categorical approach‟ to determine whether the state offense is 
comparable to an offense listed in the INA.”  133 S.Ct. at 1684 
(citations omitted).     
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omitted) (discussing whether an offense of conviction amounts 
to an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act).  Under this approach, which the BIA applied, a court 
“must look only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, 
and may not consider other evidence concerning the defendant‟s 
. . . crimes, including . . . the particular facts underlying a 
conviction.”  Borrome v. Att‟y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citations and alterations omitted).  But Rojas contends 
that the IJ and BIA should have used a modified categorical 
approach in which “a limited number of judicially noticeable 
documents [should be considered] to determine whether the 
alien was in fact convicted of a removable offense.”  Petitioner‟s 
br. at 15.  The majority, however, does not reach its result by 
applying either a formal or modified categorical approach.  
Rather, it explains that it reaches its result “simply from the text 
of the law.”  Majority typescript at 24.  But no matter what 
approach is taken it should be evident that Rojas‟s argument is 
wrong and that the Court should deny his petition for review.   
Though I limit my discussion of cases from other courts, 
our opinion in Borrome requires discussion for, as I will explain, 
the majority is repudiating a critical portion of that case.  In 
Borrome, in dealing with the relationship between the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”) and the CSA this 
Court observed that “the BIA has interpreted [„relating to‟] 
expansively: [t]he „relating to‟ concept has a broad ordinary 
meaning, namely, to stand in some relation; to have bearing or 
concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or 
connection with.”  Borrome, 687 F.3d at 160 (quoting Matter of 
Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118, 120 (BIA 2009)) (some internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, as is particularly 
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significant here the Court in Borrome also pointed out that:   
Unless an alien claims that the basis of his alleged 
removability is „a single offense involving 
possession for one‟s own use of 30 grams or less 
of marijuana,‟ § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) does not ask 
courts to scour an alien‟s indictment and sniff out 
a controlled substance, or otherwise to look to the 
underlying facts of an alien‟s conviction, to 
determine whether the alien is removable.  Such 
an inquiry would be irrelevant.   The important 
statutory phrase is „relating to a controlled 
substance,‟ and it modifies „law or regulation.‟  
See Mielewczyk v. Holder, 575 F.3d 992, 994 
(9th Cir. 2009); see also Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 
F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which is the inadmissibility 
counterpart to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), 
„applies only if the “law or regulation” violated 
relates to controlled substances‟).  An analysis of 
the laws or regulations of conviction is required.  
Therefore, our task is to determine whether the 
FDCA‟s wholesale distribution provisions, 21 
U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A), are laws 
„relating to a controlled substance‟ not (as the IJ 
seems to have believed) whether the facts of 
Borrome‟s conviction „relat[e] to a controlled 
substance.‟  
Id. at 159 (emphasis added).  The importance of the foregoing 
statement in Borrome is obvious and if I could I would doubly 
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emphasize the last sentence. 
 The Pennsylvania drug paraphernalia law stands in the 
same relationship to section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as the FDCA 
provisions the Court considered in Borrome as both are “law[s]  
. . . of a State [or] the United States.”  Thus, the question before 
the Court now is whether the Pennsylvania controlled substances 
paraphernalia possession law under which Rojas was convicted 
was a statute relating to a controlled substance as defined in 21 
U.S.C. § 802 just as in Borrome the question was whether the 
FDCA sections violated were laws relating to controlled 
substances within section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  On this point 
notwithstanding the majority‟s conclusion there should be no 
doubt. 
In Borrome, an IJ found an alien removable pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he had 
been convicted of an aggravated felony in violation of the 
FDCA as set forth in 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 353(e).  687 F.3d 
at 153.  The IJ also found the alien removable under section 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien convicted of violating a law 
“relating to a controlled substance.”  Id.  The alien appealed but 
the BIA summarily affirmed and the alien then filed a petition 
for review with this Court.  Id. at 154.  This Court granted the 
petition and vacated the order of removal, concluding that the 
FDCA provisions were not laws “relating to a controlled 
substance” as defined by 21 U.S.C. § 802 under 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  687 
F.3d at 162-63.  Nevertheless, the Court noted that the BIA and 
several other courts of appeals “have held that a law prohibiting 
the possession or use of drug paraphernalia is a law „relating to a 
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controlled substance,‟” because “[p]araphernalia statutes relate 
to controlled substances, even though they prohibit the 
possession of instruments rather than controlled substances 
themselves, because the possession of an item intentionally used 
for manufacturing, using, testing, or enhancing the effect of a 
controlled substance necessarily pertains to a controlled 
substance.”  Id. at 160 (some internal quotation marks omitted).   
In Borrome, however, the Court recognized that although 
the definition of “controlled substance” under a state law need 
“not map perfectly with the definition of „controlled substance‟ 
under the CSA,” id. (some internal quotation marks omitted), 
“the phrase „relating to . . .‟ must have limits, lest it be bent 
beyond all logical meaning.”  Id. at 162.   Accordingly, in 
Borrome the Court held that “the phrase „any law . . . relating to 
a controlled substance‟ reaches those laws that do not require 
the actual involvement of a controlled substance for a 
conviction,” but stated that “we are equally convinced that a law 
does not automatically come within the ambit of that phrase 
simply because a conviction may involve a controlled 
substance.”  Id. at 161 (emphasis in original).  The Court 
observed that some prescription drugs subject to the 
proscriptions of the FDCA in 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 353(e) 
were also “controlled substances” as defined under the CSA 
including the powerful opiate Oxycontin, but some, such as 
Viagra, were not.  The Court thus held that “[t]he coincidental 
possibility that a controlled substance might be involved with 
the violation of a law or regulation is not enough to make that 
law or regulation one „relating to a controlled substance‟ for 
deportability purposes under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).” 687 F.3d at 
161-62.   
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In reaching its conclusion in Borrome with respect to the 
limits of the CSA, the Court observed that the connection under 
the FDCA between 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 353(e) and 
controlled substance offenses was attenuated, and that although 
there is a “nexus” between prescription drugs and controlled 
substances, “[t]o see the connection . . . [,] we must rummage 
through [a] 400-plus page „Prescription Drug Product List‟ . . . 
and then hunt for a match in the roughly 100 pages of schedules 
of controlled substances in the Code of Federal Regulations.”   
Id. at 162.  The Court also recognized that those statutes 
“criminalize a substantial swath of conduct with no nexus to 
controlled substances as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802,” id., 
because those “statutes are blind to whether a particular 
prosecution involves highly addictive prescription painkillers, or 
relatively benign prescription shampoos, topical creams, or eye 
drops.”  Id.  Thus, the Court was of the view that classifying 21 
U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 353(e) as laws “„relating to a controlled 
substance‟ would stretch too far the bounds of the phrase 
„relating to.‟”  Id. 
Here, however, there is a close nexus between the state 
crime of use/possession of drug paraphernalia to which Rojas 
pleaded guilty and the CSA under 21 U.S.C. § 802 because only 
an infinitesimal portion of the drugs listed as controlled 
substances in the Pennsylvania schedules do not appear on the 
federal schedules.  As the majority points out the parties agree 
that at the time of Rojas‟s conviction the Pennsylvania 
controlled substances schedules contained only three narcotics 
not listed on the federal controlled substances schedules.  
Majority typescript at 5.  Indeed, Rojas does not even contend 
that the drug paraphernalia in his case related to one of this 
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minute fraction.  In this vein, the Department argues that Rojas‟s 
state conviction categorically falls within section 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because “Pennsylvania‟s drug schedules . . . 
closely mirror the federal ones,” and “the offense of drug 
paraphernalia is closely linked to the offense of possessing 
drugs.”  Respondent‟s br. at 19-20.   
Certainly the Department‟s assertion with respect to the 
overlap of controlled substances is correct though the 
Pennsylvania and federal lists of controlled substances are not 
precisely identical.  In considering this deviation in the 
schedules the majority misses the forest for the trees in 
performing a strict one-to-one comparison between the federal 
and state lists.  Congress, moreover, provided for slight variation 
by referencing “any law or regulation of a State” and then 
utilizing the broad language of “relating to” concerning 
controlled substances as defined in federal law.  See, e.g., Desai 
v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If Congress 
wanted a one-to-one correspondence between the state laws and 
the federal CSA, it would have used a word like „involving‟ 
instead of „relating to,‟ . . . .”).    
In any event, even though there were a minute number of 
substances that at the time of Rojas‟s paraphernalia conviction 
were controlled substances under Pennsylvania law but not 
under the CSA, section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is applicable here.  
After all, it is clear that, although, as Rojas contends, the 
Pennsylvania definition of controlled substances goes beyond 
the federal definition of controlled substances, the Pennsylvania 
drug paraphernalia law as set forth in 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-
113(a)(32) under which Rojas was convicted applies to 
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paraphernalia used in connection to a vast number of controlled 
substances as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802.  Therefore, Rojas 
pleaded guilty to a violation of a state law that related to many 
controlled substances as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802.  
The interpretation of section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) that I 
advance is consistent with the Court‟s reading of that section in 
Borrome and is supported by the “rule of the last antecedent.”  
That rule, an accepted principle of statutory interpretation, 
teaches that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be 
read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately 
follows.”  Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26, 124 S.Ct. 376, 
380 (2003) (citation omitted); see also Disabled in Action of Pa. 
v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 210 n.13 (3d Cir. 2008).  Although the 
rule is not absolute and can be negated “by other indicia of 
meaning,” the Supreme Court has said that interpreting statutes 
in conformity with the rule is „“quite sensible as a matter of 
grammar.”‟  Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26, 124 S.Ct. at 380 (quoting 
Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 330, 113 S.Ct. 
2106, 2111 (1993)).  Moreover, in Barnhart the Supreme Court 
reversed this Court for failing to adhere to this common rule of 
English grammar.  See id., 124 S.Ct. at 380-81.   
Though the majority believes that the rule of the last 
antecedent supports its result, in fact the majority is making the 
same grammatical error that this Court made in Barnhart.  As 
stated above, the statutory text in section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) at 
issue reads: 
Any alien who at any time after admission has 
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy 
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or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a 
State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21), other than a single 
offense involving possession for one's own use of 
30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable. 
The majority seems to believe that the rule of the last antecedent 
supports its result because it indicates that the parenthetical, “as 
defined in section 802 of Title 21,” “affects only its immediate 
antecedent term, „a controlled substance.‟”  Majority typescript 
at 10.  But the problem with the majority‟s analysis is that it is 
considering the last antecedent to “as defined in section 802 of 
Title 21.”  But the fact is that the rule of the last antecedent 
comes into play in this case when a court considers the last 
antecedent to the phrase “relating to a controlled substance,” and 
that antecedent certainly is “any law or regulation of a State, the 
United States, or a foreign country” and not “convicted of a 
violation.”  After all, it simply cannot be reasonably denied that 
the statute‟s plain language makes clear that the phrase “relating 
to a controlled substance” does not follow the words “convicted 
of a violation.”  Therefore, regardless of the facts underlying a 
conviction, if an alien is convicted of a violation of a state law 
relating to a controlled substance, as surely was the case here 
given Rojas‟s guilty plea for use/possession of drug 
paraphernalia under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(32), he is 
removable.  Nothing could be clearer.   
In reaching its result the majority is rejecting the plain 
meaning of section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for it says that “the 
Department must show that the conviction for which it seeks to 
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deport a foreign national involved or related to a federally-
controlled substance.”  Majority typescript at 3.  But section 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) says no such thing for what it says is that an 
alien to be deported must be convicted of a violation of a law 
“relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of 
Title 21).”  It is the law that the alien violated not the violation 
of which the alien was convicted that must be related “to a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).”  It 
is obvious that regardless of the substance involved in Rojas‟s 
case he was convicted of violating a law relating to a controlled 
substance as defined in section 802 of Title 21 and therefore the 
Court should deny his petition for review. 
I think that it is significant that in its opinion the majority 
indicates that for an individual to be deported, the Department 
must establish “that the individual it seeks to remove (1) is an 
alien (2) who at anytime after entering the country violated or 
attempted to violate a law relating to a controlled substance and 
(3) that the controlled substance is defined as such by federal 
law.”  Majority typescript at 11.  In this regard, it is clear that the 
Department did establish that Rojas is an alien who violated a 
law relating to a controlled substance as that term is defined by 
federal law even if the particular drug involved in his case did 
not come within the definition of section 802 of Title 21.  In 
effect the majority is rewriting section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) by 
adding the emphasized language so that the section reads as 
follows: 
An alien who at any time after admission has been 
convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or 
attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a 
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State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21), other than a single 
offense involving possession for one‟s own use of 
30 grams or less of marijuana is deportable, 
provided that the conviction was for an offense 
that involved a controlled substance as defined in 
21 U.S.C. § 802. 
My conclusion with respect to what the majority is 
actually doing should surprise no one for Borrome explains, 
“relating to a controlled substance . . . modifies „law or 
regulation,‟” not the facts of the offense.  687 F.3d at 159.  
Though the majority indicates that it is “embrac[ing]” Borrome, 
majority typescript at 27, in fact, it is repudiating that case‟s 
critical statement that relates “controlled substance” to “law or 
regulation” and therefore the majority is making the same 
mistake that the immigration judge made in Borrome.     
Finally, it is important to point out that in this case we are 
not concerned with a state law the violation of which might 
involve a controlled substance in an attenuated or happenstance 
way.  Quite to the contrary, the Pennsylvania law under which 
Rojas was convicted was aimed at the regulation of controlled 
substances almost all of which were controlled substances under 
both Pennsylvania and federal law.  Thus, Rojas‟s state case did 
not involve a statute impacting on controlled substances 
as a matter of chance as would be, for example, a general 
shoplifting statute which precluded the shoplifting of any 
merchandise and without specific reference included controlled 
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substances.
3
  If Rojas‟s prosecution and conviction had been 
under such a statute it would be unreasonable to say that he had 
been convicted under a law relating to a controlled substance as 
defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802.  See Borrome, 687 F.3d at 162.   
 For the reasons I have set forth I dissent from the 
majority opinion as it is clear that the Court should deny Rojas‟s 
petition for review and vacate the stay of removal that it granted 
on January 31, 2012.  Judge Fisher joins in this opinion. 
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 I recognize that in theory there could be a problem if a state 
nonsensically added a harmless product such as jelly beans to its 
controlled substances schedules but I decline to reach my result 
on that chance as Rojas does not contend that any such product 
is involved here and I see no reason to believe that a state would 
act in such an irrational way or if it did the addition would 
survive judicial review.  I further realize that, as the majority 
points out, a state in what might not be regarded as a nonsensical 
act could “include tobacco in its [controlled substances] 
schedules.”  Majority typescript at 11.  Nevertheless, the remote 
possibility that there could be such an inclusion in a state 
controlled substances schedule should not control the result in 
this case for we can be certain that if a state attempts to outlaw 
the possession or use of tobacco the tobacco industry will not be 
slow to file a district court action challenging the state law or 
regulation under, inter alia, the Supremacy and Commerce 
Clauses.  In any event, long experience has taught me not to 
decide cases to avoid a fictional parade of horribles.    
